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EMPLOYMENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
Employment law attempts to provide broad protection for employees by
eliminating discrimination from the workplace and compensating victims.'
Congress enacted remedial statutes that protect employees from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,2 age,' and disabili-
ty." This Survey examines how the Tenth Circuit dealt with several important
issues in the field of employment law during the survey period.'
Part I of this Survey addresses the controversial issue of individual liabili-
ty under Title VII. In Haynes v. Williams,6 the Tenth Circuit examined the
issue of individual liability under Title VII in the context of sexual harass-
ment. The Haynes court concluded that supervisors could not be held personal-
ly liable under Title VII. Part II of the Survey analyzes disparate impact
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In Ellis v.
United Airlines, Inc., the Tenth Circuit concluded that claims of disparate
impact are not viable under the ADEA.9
Part l examines the award of attorney's fees under Title VII. In
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group,'0 the court held that award-
ing attorney's fees against counsel under Title VII is inappropriate." Part IV
discusses when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) considers unpaid
leave a "reasonable accommodation." In Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., the court held that indefinite, unpaid leave is not a "reasonable ac-
commodation" under the ADA.'3 Finally, this Survey examines how these
Tenth Circuit decisions affect both Plaintiffs and Defendants.
1. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (detailing the purposes
underlying Title VII).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-20ooe-17 (1994).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
5. The survey period covers cases decided between September 1995 and August 1996.
6. 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996).
7. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 898-99.
8. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996).
9. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
10. 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
11. Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1508.
12. 87 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1996).
13. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169.
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I. THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL LiAn.rrY UNDER TTLE VII
A. Background
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,' and prevents retaliatory acts directed toward
employees who file complaints against an employer. 5 The Civil Rights Act
of 199116 expanded Title VII equitable relief to include compensatory and
punitive damages.' Prior to the 1991 expansion, only equitable remedies
such as reinstatement and backpay were generally assessed against employ-
ers."1
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 9 the Supreme Court agreed with
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines concluding
that Congress intended to utilize agency principles in determining employer
liability.' Under agency principles, an employee's wrongful conduct imputes
liability to the employer.2' Conduct that falls outside the legitimate scope of
the employee's authority, however, releases the employer from liability.2
Agents may be held personally liable for conduct undertaken without the ap-
parent, actual, or implied authority of the employer.' Additionally, agency
doctrine allows joint liability between the employer and agent.' The Court's
application of agency law has caused confusion among the circuits.' Thus,
the reliance on agency principles has failed to provide a clear standard on the
issue of personal supervisor liability.
Arguably, the Tenth Circuit added to the overall confusion concerning
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
15. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
16. 1&.
17. Id. § 1981a(a)(l) states, in pertinent part
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title Vi]... against a respondent
who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination.. prohibited under [this act], and
provided that the complaining party ... may recover compensatory and punitive damag-
es as allowed in subsection (b) of this section ....
Id.
18. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing pre-1991 remedies
as supporting employer liability).
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
20. Vinson, 477 U.S at 72.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating the master is liable for
torts of servants committed in the scope of their employment).
22. Id. §§ 228, 235 (stating that the act must be committed in contemplation of some benefit
to the master for employer to incur respondeat superior liability).
23. Id. § 359C(l).
24. Id. § 217B, 359C(l) (stating the principal and agent are jointly and severally liable "for
a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent and principle, and a judgment can be ren-
dered against each. .. ."); see also Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liabil-
ity for EmployeelAgent Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 39, 48-50 (1994) (making an argu-
ment for imposing joint and several liability). The Second Circuit has adopted the argument that
joint and several liability applies. See Comwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding individual supervisors jointly and severally liable under Title VI1); Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1318-19 (Parker, J., dissenting).
25. See Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of
Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 589 (1993) (stating the use of
agency principles has not managed to establish a clear standard among the courts).
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supervisor liability by failing to resolve the issue of individual liability under
Title VII.2' In Sauers v. Salt Lake County," the Tenth Circuit held that Title
VII prohibits suits against individuals in their individual capacity.' However,
six months later, the court in Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management Service
Corp.," held that an agent's status as an employer can render the agent per-
sonally liable." Recently, the Tenth Circuit characterized the issue of person-
al liability as open and unresolved.3' Furthermore, the other circuit courts are
equally divided on the issue of personal liability.Y
B. Haynes v. Williams33
1. Facts
Marcia Haynes and Melanie Dean (collectively the Plaintiffs) worked with
Gail Williams (Defendant) in a mental health unit at a prison facility operated
by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.' The Plaintiffs instituted an
action under Title VII accusing the Defendant of improper physical contact
and verbal abuse.35 The Western District Court of Oklahoma held that the
Defendant was personally liable and awarded compensatory and punitive dam-
ages to the Plaintiffs.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a supervisor could not be held
personally liable. 37 The court reasoned that the Plaintiffs must sue the em-
ployer directly for recovery under Title VII.' The Tenth Circuit relied on the
holding in Sauers to support its finding.3" Specifically, the court addressed
the apparent contradiction' between Sauers and Brownlee by finding that the
26. See Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) (avoiding the question of personal
supervisor liability).
27. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
28. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; see also Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying the Sauers rule).
29. 15 F.3d 976 (10th Cir. 1994).
30. Brownlee, 15 F.3d at 978. Brownlee is an age-discrimination case, but the Bal court
cited to it to demonstrate that confusion exists within the Tenth Circuit regarding personal liabili-
ty. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
31. Ball, 54 F.3d at 668.
32. Compare Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that su-
pervisor may qualify as an "employer" under Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th
Cir. 1990) and Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
plaintiff may properly seek recovery against individuals under Title VII), with Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1313 (precluding individual liability under Title VII), and Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no individual liability for supervisors under Title VIU), and Miller v.
Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (deciding that individuals may not be
sued personally under Title VI).
33. 88 F.3d at 898.
34. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 899.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 898.
37. Id. 898-99.
38. Id. at 899.
39. Id.
40. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
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language in Brownlee used a different agency principal that does not affect
Sauers.4' Further, the court stated that the language in Brownlee is "obiter
dictum," while the rule in Sauers was the proper holding for the case.' Final-
ly, the court concluded that even if the two cases were directly in conflict,
they would still follow the rule in Sauers.'
The court next analyzed the issue of individual liability in fight of the
remedial changes to Title VII made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' The
court interpreted the amended language of Title VII as continuing to affix
liability on the employer and not the individual supervisor.'5 Additionally, the
court reasoned that because Title VII placed caps on the possible award in
terms of the number of employees, Congress must have intended to place a
cap on employer liability.4' Congress enacted caps only for employers, which
implied that Congress did not consider individuals to be liable.' The Tenth
Circuit further reasoned that if Congress intended to hold individuals liable
under Title VII, Congress would have included individuals in the amended
statute.'
3. Analysis
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of personal liability under
Title VII. Advocates of personal liability ' suggest that the deterrence value is
strong enough to justify imposing individual liability under Title VII. ° An-
other policy argument asserts that a literal reading of Title VII appears to
support the finding of individual liability.5
Critics of individual liability argue that the language in Title VII does not
support an imposition of individual liability.52 In Haynes, the Tenth Circuit
followed the majority argument that "taken as a whole," the language used in
the amended Title VII "continue[s] to reflect the legislative judgment that
41. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 900.
42. Id. at 900.
43. Id. The court noted a published opinion of one panel constitutes binding precedent ab-
sent en banc reconsideration or a contrary Supreme Court decision. Id. at 900 n.4.
44. Id. (stating the amendments add compensatory and punitive damages to the remedies
available).
45. Id. at 901.
46. Id. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the lowest cap of $50,000 applies to employers
with more than 14 but fewer than 101 employees. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3XA) (1994).
47. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
48. Id. (stating that Congress would have discontinued the exemption for small employers if
Congress intended individual liability).
49. See Ming K. Ayvas, Note, The Circuit Split on Title Vll Personal Supervisor Liability,
23 FORDHAm URB. LJ. 797, 813-14 (1996) (discussing the competing rational of statutory inter-
pretation under Title VII); see also Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L REv. 509, 551-56 (1996) (assessing the arguments for and
against imposing individual liability).
50. See Ayvas, supra note 49, at 814-15.
51. See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Recog-
nizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 575 (1994) (noting liability turns
on who is considered the employer and defining "employe" as a person engaged in business with
15 or more employees and agents of the employer).
52. See White, supra note 49, at 551-56; see also Ayvas, supra note 49, at 805-08 (outlining
arguments for limiting Title VII to employers).
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statutory liability is appropriately borne by employers, not individual supervi-
sors."53 Furthermore, it seems inconsistent to exempt small employers who
employ fourteen or fewer persons from complying with Title VU, while hold-
ing individuals who employ no one personally liable for discrimination."
Title VII was enacted as a remedial statute and because there is no mention
whatsoever in the language of Title VII about individual liability, the Tenth
Circuit's argument is convincing.
The Haynes court cited two propositions to support the notion that Con-
gress never intended individual liability under Title VII. First, the court con-
cluded that it would be a "long stretch" to infer "Congress silently intended to
abruptly change" the meaning of the statute through an amendment that only
addresses the remedial portions of the statute.55 Second, the court concluded
that since Congress enacted liability caps for the employer and failed to ad-
dress a cap for individual liability, no individual liability was contemplated or
intended.
56
The initial impression of the court's holding in Haynes is to question any
reasoning that exonerates the person responsible for the harm. Nevertheless,
careful study will show that the Tenth Circuit's decision is appropriate under
the current federal employment discrimination scheme. 7 The language of
Title VII does not support the imposition of personal liability.
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit is one of the last circuits to address the issue of indi-
vidual liability under Title VII. The Fourth and the Sixth Circuits impose
individual liability under Title VI. The Fourth Circuit held that "[an individ-
ual qualifies as an 'employer' under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervi-
sory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing
or conditions of employment."'58 The Sixth Circuit stated that "the law is
clear," individuals may be held liable as "'agents' of an employer under Title
VII."5 9
The Second, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh, and the District of Columbia Circuits
have all refused to impose individual liability. The Second Circuit reasoned
that Title VII's failure to explicitly allow agent liability illustrates Congress's
intent not to hold individuals liable.' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that allow-
ing individual liability would be "illogical" as it would result in some employ-
ees being treated as "both an employer and an employee."' The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that Title VII's use of the term "agent" in the definition of "em-
53. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
54. See White, supra note 49, at 553.
55. Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901.
56. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
57. See generally White, supra note 49, at 544-56 (arguing that Title VII should be limited
to employers).
58. Parohne, 879 F.2d at 104.
59. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d at 1231.
60. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
61. Grant v. Lone Star, 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994).
19971
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ployer" indicated incorporation of respondeat superior liability, and not to
impose individual liability.2
1I. DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA
A. Background
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)6
3
"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age." The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against older
employees over the age of forty.'t Because of the many similarities between
the ADEA and Title VII, courts have applied some of the same theories of
liability.66
Claims under the ADEA are brought by individuals who assert that their
employers discriminated against them because of their age.67 Disparate treat-
ment claims arise when an employer treats an employee unsatisfactorily be-
cause of a protected characteristic such as age.6m Unlike disparate treatment,
disparate impact theory is based on the protected characteristic which has an
unjustified effect on members of a protected class.'9 After Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,70 it is not clear whether disparate impact extends to the ADEA.7"
The argument behind disparate impact liability was espoused by Chief Justice
Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' The basic premise is that a facially
neutral employment practice can have an unconstitutional disparate impact
upon a protected class.' The Court declined to address the issue of whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is viable under the ADEA.4
In Geller v. Markham," the Second Circuit premised liability under the
ADEA on a disparate impact theory. 6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
on appeal, but Justice Rehnquist strenuously dissented, arguing application of
disparate impact liability to the facts in Geller undermined the underlying
62. Maxwell's In'l Inc., 991 F.2d at 587; see also Haynes, 88 F.3d at 898; Gary, 59 F.3d at
1399 (agreeing with the reasoning in Miller that the agent provision in Title VII incorporated
respondeat superior liability); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying
individual liability in cases involving public employers).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
64. Id. § 621(b).
65. Id. § 621(a)(1).
66. See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L REv. 507, 513-17 (1995) (discussing
the theories of liability under the ADEA).
67. CHARLEs D. EDELMAN & ILENE C. SimLn, FEDERAL AGE DISCIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT LAW: SLOWING DOwN THE GOLD WATcH 76 (1978).
68. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
69. Id.
70. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
71. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
72. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
73. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 426.
74. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610.
75. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
76. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1031-34.
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policies and statutory provisions of the ADEA.' Justice Rehnquist found that
the "reasonable factor other than age" exception explicitly protects age-neutral
factors and would, therefore, preclude disparate impact liability in cases where
the employer's actions are based on cost factors.' He further stated that so
long as the cost rationale is not pretext, such employment practices do not
implicate the ADEA regardless of the effect on older workers.'
Justice O'Connor similarly indicated in her Hazen Paper analysis that she
would not support extending disparate impact liability to the ADEA. Other
Justices have also expressed concerns about disparate impact liability in other
opinions." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of
whether to extend disparate impact liability to the ADEA.
B. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc. "
1. Facts
Two flight attendants sued United Airlines, Inc. (United) for refusing to
hire them claiming violation of the ADEA.Y United claimed the flight atten-
dants failed to meet the company's weight restrictions.' The flight attendants
contended that the restrictions were pretextual for age discrimination and alter-
natively, that the weight restriction as applied to applicants disparately impacts
older individuals by not accounting for the natural weight gain associated with
age. "' The district court granted summary judgment for United and the flight
attendants appealed."
2. Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the disparate impact theory was cogniza-
ble under the ADEA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment," taking the opportunity to answer the question
left open by Hazen Paper." The Tenth Circuit held that the ADEA does not
77. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
78. Id. at 948-49.
79. Id.
80. See Sloan, supra note 66, at 539-42 (analyzing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hazen
Paper).
81. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (expressing concern
about disparate impact liability leading to quotas); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1988) (expressing concern that disparate impact liability may result in racial quotas);
see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (expressing concerns about the effects of
disparate impact); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (expressing concern about disparate impact potentially impos-
ing liability without a finding of fault).
82. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2500 (1996).
83. Ellis, 73 F.3d 997, 1000.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1001.
87. Id. at 1012.
88. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610 (declining to address the issue of whether the ADEA encom-
passes disparate impact theory of liability).
1997]
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recognize the theory of disparate impact liability."
Beginning with a textual analysis of the ADEA, 90 the Tenth Circuit inter-
preted the phrase "because of such individual's age" as prohibiting an employ-
er from intentionally treating individuals differently based on age,9' but not
prohibiting unintentional discrimination resulting from employment decisions
made for reasons other than age.'2 While the court generally has interpreted
the ADEA in tandem with Title VII, 3 it reasoned that the ADEA is different
from Title VII in "salient ways that counsel against interpreting the ADEA to
recognize disparate impact claims and that reinforce our reading of the text of
the ADEA."
94
First, the court reasoned that § 623(0 of the ADEA states an employer
may take action otherwise prohibited "where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." The court noted that there is similar lan-
guage in the Equal Pay Acte which the Supreme Court interpreted to pre-
clude disparate impact claims.'7
Second, the court reasoned that the legislative history of the ADEA does
not support disparate impact claims." A pre-enactment report issued by the
Secretary of Labor" recommended that "arbitrary discrimination based on
age" should be prohibited, while problems resulting from factors that "affect
older workers more strongly" should be addressed through other means."®
Further, the court noted that Congress explicitly added disparate impact claims
to Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,"' while providing no parallel pro-
vision to the ADEA 1" Citing dicta in Hazen Paper'" and a trend among
courts addressing the issue of disparate impact claims under the ADEA,"
89. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
90. Id. The ADEA's prohibition on discrimination provides that:
[lit shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age ....
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994)).
91. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
92. Id.
93. Id. (explaining that in Griggs the Supreme Court construed Title VI to create a disparate
impact theory).
94. Id. at 1007.
95. Id. at 1008.
96. The Equal Pay Act provides, in pertinent part, that employers can pay unequal wages to
men and women where the pay differential is "based on any other factor other than sex .... " 29
U.S.C. § 206(dXl) (1994).
97. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71
(1981)).
98. Id. at 1008.
99. Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER § 715
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965)) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT].
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(IXA).
102. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
103. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
104. See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1995);
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the Tenth Circuit held that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under
the ADEA.'"
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit considered the legislative history of the ADEA in its
Ellis decision."e An argument that Congress intended to extend disparate im-
pact liability to the ADEA correlates the Secretary's Report"° with the
Court's reasoning in Griggs, in which both expressed a similar concern about
arbitrary discrimination." The Tenth Circuit, however, interpreted the
Secretary's Report as recommending the prohibition of disparate impact theory
under the ADEA.Im
The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Secretary's Report appears appro-
priate considering that Congress amended Title VII, but not the ADEA, to
provide specifically for disparate impact."' The Tenth Circuit argues that by
specifically amending Title VII, and not the ADEA, Congress intended to
disallow disparate impact under the ADEA.'" However, as one commentator
remarked, "[i]t seems unpersuasive... to read so much into congressional
inaction."" 2 The legislative intent argument, standing alone, is not very com-
pelling.
The ADEA permits employment decisions based on "reasonable factors
other than age (RFOA).""' 3 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Ellis follows the
reasoning of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Geller in which he argued the
RFOA exception precludes disparate impact liability in cases where the em-
ployer bases action on cost factors even though the facially neutral action may
disparately impact older workers." 4 Justice Rehnquist further reasoned that
the RFOA exception explicitly protects age-neutral factors so long as the cost
rationale is not a pretext for discrimination based on age."
5
DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that there is
no disparate impact claim under the ADEA); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073,
1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994).
105. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008-09.
106. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
107. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 99.
108. For a general discussion favoring the allowance of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA, see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229 (1990); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Dis-
crimination. Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 715
(1990); Maria Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038 (1984).
109. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
110. For a general discussion of commentators opposed to extending disparate impact to the
ADEA, see Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Disparate Impact Doctrine to the
ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE RELA71ONS LJ. 437 (1984-85); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination
and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837 (1982).
111. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
112. Sloan, supra note 66, at 518.
113. The ADEA provides in relevant part that "[ilt shall not be unlawful for an employer...
to take any action otherwise prohibited... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age...." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
114. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 949. The cost rational argument is based on the premise that the combined effect
1997]
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The Tenth Circuit's most persuasive argument for disallowing disparate
impact liability under the ADEA is the RFOA exception. Commentators have
argued the existence of the RFOA defense implies the ADEA should be ap-
plied only to cases of disparate treatment." 6 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Geller is a good indication of how today's Court might decide the issue."'
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have already addressed the issue of disparate impact liabili-
ty under the ADEA. The Second Circuit assumed disparate impact liability ap-
plies under the ADEA in Geller v. Markham."' The Geller case was decided
before Hazen Paper, and did not conduct an analysis of the issue. Geller is
not persuasive, however, because Hazen Paper eliminated the assumption that
disparate impact applies under the ADEA." 9
The Eighth Circuit held disparate impact liability cognizable under the
ADEA.'O The Eighth Circuit case decided post-Hazen Paper, assumed with-
out analysis that disparate impact theory under the ADEA was viable.' 2' The
Ninth Circuit, also post-Hazen Paper, did not decide the issue, but referred to
earlier Ninth Circuit precedent in finding no conflict between Hazen Paper
and the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence recognizing a disparate impact claim
under the ADEA. In an unpublished opinion, the First Circuit assumed
that the district court correctly found that the ADEA supports a claim for age
discrimination on a theory of disparate impact liability'V
The Third,' 2' Sixth,'" and Seventh'2 Circuits have all concluded that
the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. The Seventh Circuit
disallowed the disparate impact challenge, holding the theory unavailable after
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper." The Third Circuit went into
great detail about the doubt Hazen Paper cast on the availability of disparate
impact liability under the ADEA,' and then ultimately refused to apply the
disparate impact theory for other reasons.'"
of higher pay, generally caused by older workers' seniority, coupled with the declining perfor-
mance, because of age-related physical deterioration, makes older workers more expensive. See,
e.g., Terrence P. Collingsworth, Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 1982 DUKE LJ. 580, 593-602 (1982).
116. See, e.g., Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1261, 1278-83 (1983). See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
117. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948.
118. Markham, 635 F.2d at 1032.
119. See, e.g., DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 733 n.20.
120. Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994).
121. Houghton 38 F.3d at 958-59.
122. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1995).
123. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831, at *3 (1st Cir. July 14,
1995).
124. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732-34.
125. Lyon, 53 F.3d at 138-39.
126. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076-77.
127. Id. at 1076-77.
128. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 725-29.
129. Id. at 727-28.
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M. AWARDING ATrORNEY'S FEES AGAINST COUNSEL
A. Background
Litigants usually pay their own attorneys' fees under the "American"
rule.'" In some situations, including litigation under Title VII,'3' the losing
party can be ordered to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees. 32 In
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 33 the Supreme Court held that a pre-
vailing defendant may recover reasonable attorney's fees under Title VII if the
plaintiff's action was frivolous.'" However, the Supreme Court noted in
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,3- that Title VII does not authorize the im-
position of attorney's fees against opposing coun-el. 3
If a plaintiff's attorney is responsible for bringing a frivolous suit, the
court must impose sanctions from sources other than Title VII.'3 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11)1 3" allows an award of attorney's fees
against counsel in these situations.'39 Some courts hesitate to assess sanctions
against opposing counsel under Title VII, but they assess sanctions under Rule
11." o The imposition of attorney's fees against counsel under Title VII re-
mained an unresolved issue in the Tenth Circuit. In Roadway, the Supreme
Court noted that Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 fee provisions are identi-
cal. 4 The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in the context of § 1988 in
Crabtree v. Muchmore." In Crabtree, the Tenth Circuit remanded to have
attorney's fees awarded under § 1988 or Rule 11 depending upon who was at
fault between the client and the attorney. 43 Other circuits have held that §
1988 does not support the imposition of attorney's fees against opposing coun-
sel.
1"
130. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(stating that under the Traditional American Rule," each party is responsible for its own
attorney's fees).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing: "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ...
132. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 260-61.
133. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
134. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
135. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
136. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761 n.9.
137. See, e.g., Susan R. Bogart, Civil Procedure--Third Circuit Suggests that Attorney Who
"Should Have Known Better" Share in Paying Attorney Fee Sanctions for Frivolous Employment
Discrimination Suit--Quiroga Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 376
(1981), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 959 (1992) (discussing the sanctions applicable to attorneys).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 [hereinafter Rule 11].
139. See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rnv. 211, 289-
96 (1992) (discussing how Rule 11 intersects with Title VII).
140. See, e.g., Johnson v. New York Transit Auth., 823 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1987) (awarding
fees against attorney pursuant to Rule 11).
141. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761.
142. 904 F.2d 1475 (10th Ci. 1990).
143. Crabtree, 904 F.2d at 1479.
144. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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B. Comeveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group"
1. Facts
Mary Corneveaux worked for CUNA Mutual Insurance Society (CUNA)
for thirteen years." CUNA, in 1989, phased out Corneveaux's position due
to company wide downsizing." Corneveaux applied for another position and
the company hired a male employee instead.'
Comeveaux brought suit against CUNA alleging age discrimination and
retaliation, sexual and religious discrimination, and breach of an implied con-
tract under Utah law."9 The trial court ordered Corneveaux's counsel to pay
$5,000 for attorney's fees incurred by CUNA in defense of the gender and
religious discrimination claims." ° CUNA's counsel questioned the appropri-
ateness of ordering Corneveaux's counsel to pay the fees under Title VII and
suggested a finding under Rule 11 instead.'5' The trial court found
Corneveaux's Title VII claims "unreasonable and groundless," yet the court
found no Rule 11 violation."52 The trial court further stated it was basing the
award for attorney's fees solely on Title VI. 5 3 The award of attorney's fees
against plaintiff's counsel under Title VII appeared as an issue of first impres-
sion in the Tenth Circuit during the survey period.
2. Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees against the Plaintiffs counsel based solely on Title
VII. The Tenth Circuit reversed, vacating the award of attorney's fees.'"
The court found that the trial court erred and the language of Title VII did not
support the award of attorney's fees against opposing counsel. 55 The Tenth
Circuit noted that in Roadway, the Supreme Court stated "[n]either § 1988 nor
§ 2000e-5(k) makes any mention of attorney liability for costs and fees."''
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the Crabtree case which was the next
authority cited by the trial court in awarding attorney's fees. The court dis-
tinguished this case from Crabtree because the trial court here had already
ruled Rule 11 sanctions were inappropriate." Thus, attorney's fees could not
be awarded against the Plaintiff s attorney.
145. 76 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1996).
146. Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1502.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1501.




154. Id. at 1509.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761).
157. Id. at 1509. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.




The Supreme Court's notation in Roadway, that § 2000e-5(k) fails to
mention attorney liability for fees, is conclusive that Tide VII does not autho-
rize the imposition of attorney's fees against opposing counsel.'" Further, in
reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Crabtree, the trial court erroneously
applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand,'" which addressed the proper alloca-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions between an attorney and the client."' Rule 11
sanctions were not at issue in Corneveaux. Neither Title VII nor the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Crabtree support a finding by the trial court of an award
of attorney's fees against opposing counsel.
One purpose for awarding attorney's fees is to discourage frivolous law-
suits. " Even though Title VII does not allow the awarding of attorney's fees
against counsel, other means are available to lower courts in sanctioning an
attorney. The Third Circuit referred to Rule I 1 and the court's inherent power
to control the judicial process as means for sanctioning attorneys. There-
fore, if a lower court believes counsel is responsible for bringing a frivolous
suit, the court should sanction the attorney by a means other than Title VII's
fee shifting provision.
C. Other Circuits
Several circuit courts have already concluded that it is inappropriate to
award attorney's fees against counsel in a Tide VII action. The Third Circuit
recognized that Title VII "does not authorize assessment of fees against the
loser's attorney."'" The Sixth Circuit held that "an award under section 1988
may only be charged against the losing party, not the party's attorney."'"
The Seventh Circuit held that "[s]ection 1988 only authorizes the imposition
of fees against parties to the litigation, not their attorneys."'" The Eleventh
Circuit held § 2000e-5(k) "contemplates assessments of attorney's fees against
losing parties, not against counsel." 67 Clearly, many circuits support the
Tenth Circuit's decision not to allow an award of attorney's fees against coun-
sel under Title VII.
IV. DEFNMG THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILrrEs ACT
A. Background
The purpose underlying the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) is the prevention of employment discrimination against those who
159. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 761. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
160. 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
161. Chevron, 763 F.3d at 1187.
162. Bogart, supra note 137, at 959.
163. Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504 (3d Cir. 1991).
164. Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 504.
165. Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1374 n.l (6th Cir. 1987).
166. Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1987).
167. Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 915 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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are disabled."s An employer violates the ADA if a qualified individual with
a disability requests a reasonable accommodation which would enable the
employee to perform the job and the employer refuses despite the fact that the
accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer."6
The ADA is "an antidiscrimination statute that requires that individuals with
disabilities be given the same consideration for employment that individuals
without disabilities are given."'"
The Tenth Circuit adopted a two-part test for determining whether a dis-
abled person qualifies under the ADA.'7 ' First, the court determines "wheth-
er the individual could perform the essential functions of the job."'"2 Second,
if the court concludes the individual cannot perform the essential functions of
the job, the court must determine whether any reasonable accommodation by
the employer would enable the employee to perform the job.'"
Considerable uncertainty exists regarding what constitutes "reasonable
accommodation."' 74 Reasonable accommodation is generally interpreted as a
standard requiring the employer to accommodate a disabled employee until
such accommodation becomes an undue hardship on the employer." A rea-
sonable accommodation may include altering the physical layout of the
workplace, 76 making changes to the position itself,'" and providing addi-
tional unpaid leave.'"
Unpaid leave may be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit held that the ADA does not require an employer to
grant an employee indefinite leave as an accommodation."' Other circuit
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (providing in pertinent part: "[nlo [employer) ... shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."). For a historical overview of the ADA, see generally Chai R. Feldblum, The Revolution of
Physical Disability Anti-Discrimination Law: 1976-1996, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABnLxTY L
REP. 613 (1996) (providing a historical overview of the ADA).
169. See Stephanie Jae Stevenson, Tenth Circuit Survey: Disability Law, 73 DENy. U. L REV.
707, 723 (1996). The article discusses additional qualifications for disabled status under the ADA.
Id. at 720-23.
170. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 1630.1(a) (1995).
171. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Chandler v. City
of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993)).
172. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
173. Id. at 361-62.
174. See generally Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do Injured Workers Pay for Reason-
able Accommodation?, 50 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 92 (1996) (discussing the uncertainty that ex-
ists with respect to reasonable accommodation); Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 201 (1993) (detailing what constitutes a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA).
175. See Gunderson & Hyatt, supra note 174, at 93.
176. Development in the Law"The Americans with Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater
Potential, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1602, 1611 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Laura Pincus, The Americans with Disabilities Act; Employers' New Responsibilities to
HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 578 (1993); see also McDonald v. Dep't of
Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1995).
179. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
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courts have reached similar conclusions."W The issue of indefinite leave as a
reasonable accommodation remained unresolved in the Tenth Circuit until the
current survey period.
B. Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.'""
1. Facts
April Hudson worked for MCI Telecommunications (MCI) as a customer
service representative. 2 Hudson's duties required her to spend approximate-
ly six hours a day on the phone and at a computer keyboard."8 3 Hudson was
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and her treating physician issued re-
strictions that she was to take fifteen minutes off for each hour of repetitive,
digital activity.'
She worked the next month and a half doing tasks that did not involve
typing or keyboard activity.' MCI suspended Hudson for being tardy and
later terminated her.'s6 After her termination she underwent surgery to cor-
rect the problem and her physician lifted her work restrictions." Hudson
brought the action alleging MCI failed to provide reasonable accommodations
thereby violating the ADA.'" The district court granted MCI's motion for
summary judgment and Hudson appealed.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that
Hudson failed to establish that an indefinite leave of absence would be a "rea-
sonable accommodation" under the ADA.'" The court noted that the plaintiff
conceded she could not perform the essential functions of her job. 9 ' How-
ever, she alleged MCI failed to "reasonably accommodate" her by refusing her
unpaid leave while she sought treatment."
The court noted that in Myers,"" the Fourth Circuit "concluded that the
term 'reasonable accommodation' refers to those accommodations which pres-
ently, or in the near future, enable the employee to perform the essential func-
tions of his job."' 4 The court agreed with the plaintiff that an unpaid leave
may be a reasonable accommodation, but the court concluded in this case that
the plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the duration of the impair-
180. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying texL
181. 87 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1996).






188. Id. at 1167.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1169.
191. Id. at 1168-69.
192. Id. at 1169.
193. Myers, 50 F.3d at 278.
194. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Myers, 50 F.3d at 283).
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ment.' 9 Thus, the court concluded that MCI was not required to wait indefi-




The ADA guidelines provide that reasonable accommodations may include
additional unpaid leave for necessary medical treatment. 9' A per se rule that
unpaid leave of an indefinite period could never constitute a reasonable ac-
commodation, such as the one opined in Hudson, is irrational. The court in
Hudson did not clarify why unpaid leave should be analyzed differently from
other proposed accommodations under the ADA. Whether any accommodation
is reasonable should be analyzed by the specific circumstance in a given
case.'9" The courts should apply the same criteria to unpaid leave as other
proposed accommodations. 99
A per se rule is irrational because it is possible that an indefinite leave
could be a reasonable accommodation. For example, a large employer with a
very high turnover and unskilled labor force could provide indefinite leave as
a reasonable accommodation if the leave allows an employee to eventually
perform the essential job functions and the leave did not inflict undue hardship
upon the employer. In Hudson, MCI refused to provide unpaid leave while
Hudson sought necessary medical treatment and the court concluded that in-
definite leave was not a reasonable accommodation without an analysis of
whether it would impose an undue hardship upon MCI.2'
The plaintiff in Hudson failed to produce evidence as to the expected
duration of her impairment by the date of termination."' A notation made by
the plaintiff's physician on the day after termination indicated surgery would
end the plaintiff's impairment.2 Applying the court's reasoning, if the plain-
tiff had been terminated a day later, the unpaid leave would constitute a rea-
sonable accommodation. Furthermore, for a company to avoid liability in
unpaid leave cases, it need only terminate an employee before the employee
provides them with any evidence as to the expected duration of the unpaid
leave.
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits have addressed the issue of unpaid leave as a reasonable
accommodation, reaching the same result that the Tenth Circuit reached in
Hudson. The Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable accommodation under the
195. Id. at 1169.
196. Id.
197. See 29 C.F.R. pt.1630 app at 1630.2(o) (1996) (providing interpretive guidance of Title I
of the ADA).
198. See Lee, supra note 174, at 235-43.
199. See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text
200. Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.




ADA does not include indefinite leave.' The Fifth Circuit similarly held
that an employer is "not required to make reasonable accommodation[s] in the
form of an indefinite leave of absence." Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held
that an employer is not under a duty to keep employees on unpaid leave until
a position opens up that will reasonably accommodate them.' The Third
Circuit, however, stated that "some case law might support the plaintiff's posi-
tion that an unpaid leave of absence is an appropriate accommodation in some
circumstances."
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit made it easier to defend
against employment discrimination claims. The court's decision in Haynes is
appropriate under the current federal employment law scheme. The language
of Title VII does not support a finding of personal liability. The application of
this holding does not preclude individuals from being liable, it only precludes
them from being liable under Tide VII. Individuals may still be sued under
state tort law.
The Tenth Circuit makes a persuasive argument for precluding disparate
impact liability under the ADEA in Ellis. The RFOA exception in the ADEA
along with Justice Rehnquist's dissent for denial of certiorari in Gellar, estab-
lish a compelling argument that a disparate impact theory is not cognizable
under the ADEA. Plaintiffs must now show intentional or disparate treatment
to prevail under the ADEA.
The only Tenth Circuit decision rendered during the survey period that
benefits plaintiffs is Corneveaux. If the Corneveaux court had reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that counsel may be liable for attorney's fees
under Title VII, this would discourage attorneys from bringing actions under
Title VII. The majority is clear that Tide VII does not support the finding that
counsel can be held liable for attorney's fees.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit's decision concerning reasonable accommoda-
tion under the ADA further burdens plaintiffs. The court hindered plaintiffs by
requiring them not only to establish that unpaid leave is a reasonable accom-
modation, but plaintiffs must also provide evidence as to the expected duration
of the impairment by the date of termination. This ruling is unsound because
the court failed to consider whether the indefinite leave imposed an undue
hardship on the defendant.
John Michael Anderson
203. Myers, 50 F.3d at 283.
204. Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1996).
205. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996).
206. McDonald, 62 F.3d at 97.
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